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Three new contributions are added to the literature on subsidized rental housing 
impacts on nearby property values: 1) A primary focus on the spatial heterogeneity of these 
effects which warrants caution regarding citywide results; 2) an analysis by zoning area, and 
3) a comparison of impacts with unsubsidized apartments. An adjusted-interrupted time series 
(difference-in-difference) model is estimated with a comprehensive dataset for Seattle, WA 
(1987-97). Contrary to NIMBY expectations, the predominant impact is an upgrading effect 
of lower-value areas.  However, spillover effects are very sensitive to how data are pooled 
across space: The citywide upgrading effects are driven by poorer pockets adjacent to 
affluent areas with no or small effects in more diverse low- and medium income areas. They 
only occur in single-family, not multi-family zones. The only negative effects were 
associated with vouchers in one of the affluent areas. Impacts of unsubsidized rentals are 
very similar to those of subsidized ones, suggesting an independent effect beyond subsidy 
status. These findings are explained with Seattle’s dispersion and good neighbor policies, 
with gentrification pressures as a possible alternative explanation. Site visits confirmed the 
location of subsidized sites in lower-value areas and the higher maintenance quality of 
subsidized vis-à-vis unsubsidized units. 
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“Not in My Backyard!” is the familiar battle cry of homeowners who fear a decline in 
property values and quality of life if their new neighbors are publicly subsidized tenants. In 
contrast, researchers are asking “Why Not in My Backyard!?” after analyzing the evidence 
on spillover effects from assisted rental housing to nearby home values (Galster et al. 2003).  
The question whether negative spillover effects result from nearby publicly assisted rental 
housing has fueled debate and research for several decades.  It is a methodologically vexing 
question that continues to be highly relevant in the current policy environment of 
deconcentrating poverty through scattered-site public housing such as HOPE VI and mobility 
programs such as Housing Choice Vouchers.  
Under what conditions are host neighborhoods stabilized or destabilized by new 
subsidized rental units? By isolating these conditions, the latest research on this question 
highlights the context-sensitivity of subsidized rental spillover impacts: Impacts depend on 
factors such as distance, unit size, geographic concentration, program, housing type, and,   2
often harder to measure, management quality, housing design, and tenant characteristics 
(Galster et al., 2003; Galster et al., 2004; Galster et al., 1999; Santiago et al., 2001; Ellen et 
al., 2001; Ellen and Voicu, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2006).  Further, this research shows that 
spillover effects are often not linear but subject to threshold effects.  
This article applies the same methodology of this latest research but makes three new 
contributions to this literature: 1) It assesses the spatial heterogeneity of subsidized rental 
spillover effects as a primary research objective rather than a secondary focus as usually 
done; 2) in this context, it analyzes differential impacts in single- and multi-family zoning 
areas; and 3) it compares rental spillovers of subsidized apartments to those of unsubsidized 
ones.  What inspired this study was an interest in testing how sensitive impact results are to 
the choice of different sub-areas, especially zoning areas. The motivation to include 
unsubsidized rental apartments in the analysis was driven by the suspicion that spillover 
effects might importantly result from the difference between rental and owner housing, 
irregardless of whether or not the rental unit is subsidized.  If this was true, then the focus in 
the current literature (and among homeowners) on the subsidy status of a rental unit could 
miss an important dimension. 
  The question of spatial variation in spillover effects only emerges as a challenge in 
the last two decades when studies moved from a single site as the unit of analysis to a city, 
regional or even national level.  Studies of a single rental site or a small number of sites (e.g., 
MaRous, 1996: 28) are often very attentive to the idiosyncrasies that characterize their sites 
and the surrounding neighborhoods.  The interest in finding generalizable impacts at larger 
scales makes it tempting to lose sight of the fact that the interaction between extremely 
heterogeneous neighborhoods and apartments can generate varying impacts.   
For instance, while this study generally found upgrading effects associated with 
rental units in Seattle, this effect only occurred in single-family zoning areas. In contrast, in 
one affluent area, homes near apartments with voucher holders did experience slight negative 
property value impacts (other studies found negative effects in low-income areas, e.g. Galster 
et al. 1999).  In other words, the findings from this study and that of the current literature 
(e.g., Schwartz et al., 2006; Galster et al. 2003) demonstrate that the assumption of spatial 
stationarity does not hold, i.e. spillover effects should not be assumed to be constant across 
sub-areas of a city.  The important implication of this finding is that when aggregate results 
are reported (e.g. at the city, metropolitan or national level), these results are likely driven by 
subsets of the data that are not representative of all areas.   
   3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The conceptual framework most relevant to this analysis suggests that impacts are 
likely to occur when differences between the quality of housing and the characteristics of 
occupants in a subsidized project and a host neighborhood are large enough to be notable 
(Freeman and Botein 2002).  In other words, if there is no difference between the quality of a 
subsidized unit and its surrounding units and the occupants in both, then it is unlikely that a 
subsidized unit will impact prices of neighboring units.  Conversely, in Lyon and Loveridge’s 
(1993: 58) words, “the greater the relative difference in value between subsidized units and 
non-subsidized units the greater the negative effect of the presence of subsidized units” 
Economic research suggests that owner-occupied units can be expected to be kept up 
at higher maintenance levels (Galster 1983; Galster 1987; Shilling et al. 1991; Ioannides 
2002), that renter-occupancy of single-family homes reduces values of nearby owner-
occupied homes (Wang et al. 1991) and that homeowners are willing to pay a premium for 
living near other homeowners (Coulson et al. 2003a; Coulson et al. 2003b), i.e. to avoid 
living near renters.  Hence, ceteris paribus, subsidized rental units and tenants are 
hypothesized to have a negative impact on nearby home prices.  However, given Seattle’s 
pro-active dispersion and neighbor relations guidelines, these impacts are probably mitigated 
to a large extent.  Research also found that subsidized housing tends to be sited in areas with 
below-average home values and that it is associated with removal and physical structure 
effects (Schwartz et al. 2006).  In areas with lower values and/or pre-existing disamenities 
that are replaced by the new rental sites, a net increase in values might result. 
Evidence suggests that impacts are often subject to cluster and threshold effects 
(Ellen and Voicu 2006; Galster et al. 1999; Galster et al. 2003).  Hence, differences of 
individual properties/occupants can be expected to only become significant as the result of a 
cumulative effect, e.g. when a critical unit threshold is reached and/or when a significant 
number of subsidized sites cluster in space.  What complicates matters is that the critical 
point of these threshold effects is also not constant across space but context-specific. 
  No spillover effects from rental housing on owner prices are expected in those areas 
where the rental unit constitutes a “close substitute” to nearby units.  More specifically, in 
multi-family zoning areas, the hypothesis is that there are no impacts of either subsidized 
project-based or tenant-based units or of unsubsidized apartments since all of these new 
rental units are principally substitutable for existing units (if anything, they might initially 
have positive impacts due to a new construction effect that would diminish over time).  Here   4
substitutability is defined by occupancy status (owner-occupied versus renter-occupied) and 
unit size (primarily relevant for multi-family units with greater variation in unit sizes). 
In single-family zoning areas, the largest negative impacts are predicted for new 
renter-occupied units since the latter are not substitutes for the former and are associated with 
lower housing values.  Threshold effects in these areas are likely associated with smaller 
distances and larger site/unit numbers (Quercia and Galster 2000).  The characteristics of 
Seattle outlined below could make negative spillover effects less likely than in other cities.  
In fact, the proximity to well-managed subsidized low-income rental housing might be an 
advantage for middle-income homebuyers who otherwise could not afford to purchase homes 
in attractive areas bordering public housing garden communities (e.g., in West Seattle, 
expensive homes with Puget Sound view were near the old Highpoint garden community but 
separated from it by a ravine).   
Several reasons motivate the hypothesis that the difference between rental and owner 
units might be as important a determinant of spillover effects as the difference between 
subsidized and unsubsidized rental units.  One reason is that research has shown that 
homeowners often fail to accurately distinguish between rental units that are subsidized and 
unsubsidized.  For instance, in focus groups with homeowners and housing authority officials 
in Denver (Galster et al. 2003), residents erroneously assumed that tenants who are causing 
neighborhood problems live in subsidized units when in fact they did not.  In focus groups in 
Seattle, participants complained about student rental housing while subsidized low-income 
rental housing was not mentioned (Seattle Department of Planning and Development 2005).   
Further, especially with the onset of more complicated mixed housing financing 
streams at the federal and state level (such as the Low Income Housing Tax Credit and 
Housing Trusts Funds), the same housing project contains both subsidized and unsubsidized 
rental units, making it impossible to classify the project even objectively in either category.  
A similar situation exists when tenants with a rent subsidy move into multi-family housing 
units where possible impacts they might have are mitigated by larger numbers of other, often 
unsubsidized, tenants.  Buildings and tenants transition in and out of being subsidized or not: 
For instance, the subsidy status for the same unit can continuously change as unsubsidized 
and subsidized tenants change occupancy.  Conversely, when use restrictions expire (e.g., 
related to Low Income Housing Tax Credit subsidies), a subsidized building can become 
converted to market-rate rental housing or be converted to condominiums. 
In addition, some unsubsidized private entities serve the same special needs renters 
that subsidized agencies serve.  For instance, some churches in Seattle offer rooming houses 
that are comparable to nonprofit-operated single-room occupancy (SRO) buildings; privately   5
owned flophouse motels “rent” rooms to homeless residents that might also be housed at 
some point by these other agencies.  These rental buildings are often concentrated in space, a 
fact that is ignored when only the presence of a subsidized SRO operator is included in a 
statistical model. 
 
The Case of Seattle 
 
The findings of this study are based on 1987-97 data for Seattle, WA.  In many ways, 
the characteristics of Seattle are a threat to external validity.  Its real estate market is stronger 
and its housing, planning, and environmental policies have been and continue to be more 
liberal and activist than the national average.  Also known as the “Emerald City,” Seattle 
benefits from an unusually attractive geographic layout that results in an especially spatially 
segmented housing market.  Seattle’s residents are wealthier, more educated, less diverse, 
and more liberal than the average American resident.  What distinguishes Seattle further from 
other cities is that on the supply-side its subsidized housing developments are better managed 
and on the demand side, moderate- and higher-income homeowners are less likely to value 
diversity in neighborhood tenure status as a disamenity (see, e.g., Seattle’s new HOPE VI 
developments, which are green New Urbanist developments that integrate public housing 
tenants and market-rate homeowners).   
Combined, these factors make it more likely than in other cities that potential 
negative impacts from new rental housing are mitigated.  Hence, findings from this study are 
likely more comparable with those for cities such as New York, San Francisco, or Portland,  
which also face growth and gentrification pressures instead of Philadelphia, Cleveland or 
Detroit, which struggle with population decline and neighborhood destabilization. 
 
The Issue of Submarkets 
 
An analysis of spatial heterogeneity of spillover effects needs to address the question 
how it relates to the literature on housing submarkets.  In this literature, there is a debate 
between traditional proponents of a non-spatial definition of submarkets (e.g., Rothenberg et 
al 1991) and more recent advocates of spatially defined submarkets (e.g., Bourassa et al. 
2003, Bourassa et al. 2005).  A housing submarket consists of dwellings that constitute “close 
substitutes” (Grisby 1963).  Spatial submarket proponents define these close substitutes by 
taking the spatial proximity of properties into account -- essentially, properties with similar   6
characteristics in similar locations constitute spatial submarkets.  A common strategy to 
define such submarket boundaries geographically is to apply cluster or factor analysis to the 
same or similar variables that are included in a hedonic regression.  The spatial submarket 
approach is often viewed critically based on the economic-theory argument that different 
submarkets imply different equilibria.
1 
The recent housing demand and neighborhood effects literature (e.g., Ioannides and 
Zabel, 2003; 2008; Coulson et al., 2003a; 2003b; Bond and Coulson, 1989; Henderson and 
Ioannides, 1989; and Rapaport, 1997) can bridge these two approaches since it is rooted in 
utility and hedonic theory but extends the traditional non-spatial focus on housing structure to 
include neighborhood choice.  As this literature illustrates, the choice for housing structure 
and neighborhood is a joint decision and needs to be modeled simultaneously to avoid 
endogeneity.  One such application is by Ugarte et al (2004) who use mixed linear models 
and expectation-maximization (EM) algorithms to jointly estimate the hedonic price of 
property characteristics and the spatially contingent and homogenous categories (submarkets) 
of such characteristics.   
An ad-hoc alternative to jointly estimating structural characteristics and clusters of 
these characteristics is to use previously defined area boundaries of policy and planning 
interest and then run separate models for these areas.  While the traditional AITS-DID model 
applications do not specify submarket boundaries, they are usually estimated for subsets of 
the housing market, such as high or low income households.  This study also uses pre-
existing spatial boundaries – further, in its choice of single- and multi-family zoning areas, 
non-spatial and spatial definitions of submarkets overlap. 
Hence this study starts with a non-spatial definition of submarkets a la Rothenberg et 
al. (1991) with a focus on submarkets by tenure choice, i.e. owner and rental housing.  The 
question in this context is essentially about what happens to owner prices when rental and 
owner submarkets overlap in space.  In other words, what is of interest is a spillover effect 
that results from the spatial contiguity of properties from two submarkets.  Multi-family 
zones rather closely approximate a spatially defined rental submarket although they also 
include some owner-occupied single-family homes.  Although single-family homes are the 
predominant land use in single-family zoning areas, these areas are harder to classify as a 
spatially defined owner submarket since single-family homes can also be renter-occupied.  
  Bates’ (2006) argument that submarket boundaries should be taken into consideration 
in targeting affordable housing investments is relevant here (although she derives her 
submarket boundaries through factor analysis rather than pre-defined boundaries).  The   7
boundaries of multi-family zoning and overlay areas are often used by planners to site 
subsidized rental housing to mitigate potential through compatibility with nearby units. 
 
EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
       
The large body of studies on property value impacts of subsidized rental housing has 
been extensively summarized (Martinez 1988; Goetz et al. 1996; Galster et al. 2000; Freeman 
and Botein 2002; Nguyen 2005; Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, 2006).  The problem 
of spatial heterogeneity in spillover effects arises primarily since the 1980s when the 
technological and data possibilities exist to analyze spillover effects in the aggregate such as 
at the city, metropolitan or national level. Since the methodological flaws of previous models 
in the literature are well-documented, this study is based on the most current model originally 
developed by Galster et al. (2004) as an “adjusted interrupted time series” (AITS) model and 
broadly applied with adjustments by Ellen et al. (2001) as a difference-in-difference (DID) 
model. The terminology is confusing since both models as applied in the spillover literature 
are very similar. Originally, DID models only measure differences in coefficient levels while 
the AITS also compares pre- and post price trends. To pay tribute to both sets of research, 
this study refers to the model as AITS-DID (outlined in detail in the methodology section).  
As was typical of earlier research (e.g., Nourse, 1963; Schafer, 1972; Saunders and 
Woodford, 1979; Baird, 1980; Babb et al., 1984), control area studies analyze impacts of a 
single or small number of sites, which precludes a focus on the spatial heterogeneity of 
impacts. Several regression-based studies only report citywide results (e.g., Cummings and 
Landis, 1993; Galster and Williams, 1994; Goetz et al., 1996; Lee et al. 1999).  However, 
since the 1980s, studies start to address the question of neighborhood variation (e.g., Colwell 
et al., 2000) and often include several paragraphs on how results vary by sub-area, primarily 
defined by income and race. Echoing the conclusion of this study, differences in findings 
vary so much across areas that they are hard to generalize. 
For instance, some studies find negative impacts in distressed African-American 
areas and upgrading effects in rich, white areas (Galster et al., 1999; Galster et al., 2003; 
Santiago et al, 1999).  In an analysis of 204 publicly financed private units in Virginia (Baird, 
1980), one low-income area experienced detrimental property value impacts.  In contrast, 
impacts in another were positive, as were impacts in two high-income areas.  
Other studies find the opposite: Upgrading effects in poor areas and adverse or no 
impacts in rich areas: For instance, Farber (1986) finds that group homes for mentally 
handicapped tenants (former single-family homes) in Louisiana led to sale delays in affluent   8
white areas but positive impacts in low-income white areas.  In Lyons and Loveridge’s 
(1993) study, suburban homes are more negatively affected than urban homes.  Four larger 
project-based sites in Chicago registered no impact in suburban white neighborhoods but 
positive impacts in poor minority areas (Warren et al., 1983). In New York City, 
new/rehabilitated city housing generated larger upgrading effects in low-income than high-
income areas (Schwartz et al., 2006).   
Unsubsidized Rental Spillovers  
 
Compared to the literature on subsidized rental housing spillovers, that on 
unsubsidized spillovers is sparse.  This is largely due to a lack of data on private rental 
housing, particularly data on renter-occupied single-family homes.  However, there are 
interesting parallels between the two literatures, including similar hypotheses about negative 
spillover effects.  These parallels shift the focus from the subsidized nature of rental housing 
to the difference between rental and owner housing.  If rental housing has negative spillover 
effects independently of subsidy status, then negative subsidized-unit findings might 
overstate the impact that is attributed to the subsidy.  
A few studies do exist, for instance, Arthur Nelson’s work (Nelson and Moody 
forthcoming) and a hedonic regression analysis by Pollakowski et al. (2005) which both 
apply case-control designs very similar to the subsidized literature although both take zoning 
into account.  Nelson and Moody use network distance and a cross-sectional design and find 
that planning decisions in regards to housing design and zoning can mitigate negative 
spillover effects.  Pollakowski et al. also find no evidence of detrimental impacts in any of 
their seven case studies.  A study that employed a regression model found negative impacts 
of renter-occupied single-family homes on nearby owner-occupied homes (Wang et al. 
1991).  However, it suffered from the same flaw of the earlier subsidized housing literature 




The AITS-DID model compares price differentials in the same area before and after a 
rental site was completed with those in comparable nearby areas more distant from the rental 
site (hence, difference-in-difference).  At the core of the AITS-DID models is a hedonic price 
model (Rosen 1974), which is grounded in utility theory.  The implicit or hedonic price 
reflects a consumer’s preference for the attributes of the bundled good housing, given the   9
utility the consumer derives from the attributes (within a budget constraint).  Equation 1 
represents a general hedonic equation where a property’s price P (N x 1 vector) is a function 
of S (a matrix of structural characteristics), L (a matrix of locational characteristics) and N (a 
matrix of social and neighborhood characteristics).    
 
General hedonic equation: 
) , , ( N L S f P =           (1) 
 
In the AITS-DID context, the neighborhood attribute associated with each property is 
of primary interest.  The idea is that there is an implicit price for neighborhoods with and 
without (un)subsidized rental housing developed during the study period.  The base model in 
equation 2 specifies the components of the structural, locational and neighborhood 
characteristics for repeated cross-sections (in this case 1987-1997): 
 
Baseline model: 
int int ) ln( ε η ζ δ γ β α + + + + + + = i it n it it it D X N L T S P            (2) 
 
where ln(P)int is the logged sales price of property i in neighborhood n at time t.  The 
structural characteristics in the matrix Sit include indicators for housing type (duplex and 
triplex homes, with detached single-family as the excluded category), housing quality (the 
lowest (1-5) and highest (10-13) construction grades, an indicator for good housing 
condition, and the percentage of exterior brick or stone of a property), size and height (size of 
living area as well as basement area (logged) and the number of stories), amenities (an 
indicator for the presence of a fire place), age (seven indicators of year built, an indicator for 
whether or not the property was ever renovated, and indicators for electric and oil heating 
sources (electric heaters predominate in older buildings in Seattle)).  Tit includes a set of time 
variables: Indicators for the year of sale (with 1987 as the excluded category) and three 
indicators for the quarter in which the sale occurred, to account for seasonal differences.   
Locational features Lit include (logged) parcel size, elevation in feet above sea level, 
an indicator for view, and whether or not the property is located within 1,000 feet of Seattle’s 
“Gold Coast” (Lake Washington or Puget Sound), an indicator for the proximity to parks 
(within 250 feet), and the geographic coordinates of each property (normalized by the 
distance to downtown) to capture any remaining locational attributes.
2  
Time-invariant and unobservable neighborhood characteristics (Nn) are captured 
through a set of spatial fixed effects (n is generally specified as 1990 census tracts; an 
alternative specification for comparison purposes is based on residential areas as defined by   10
the King County Department of Assessments).
3  Finally, the micro-neighborhoods at the 
heart of the analysis are specified in the XitDi term where Di is a set of binary distance bands 
defined below and the Xit matrix consists of four impact variables: Two indicators that mark 
the presence of a sale before or after a rental unit was completed within the distance bands 
and two trend variables that measure the distance in years between the sale date and the first 
study year or the first subsidized unit completion year (these variables are described in more 
detail below).  Epsilon ( int ε ) represents the error term of the model, which is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).  The associated coefficients  η ζ δ γ β α , , , , ,  
are estimated using traditional OLS with robust standard errors to account for any 
heteroskedasticity that might violate the constant variance assumption.   
The XitDi term can be explained as follows.  The sales in the pooled sample (e.g., 
1987-1997) can be divided into two groups: Control sales and impact sales.  Control sales are 
sales that are not within the vicinity, defined as a micro-neighborhood, of (un)subsidized 
housing.  Impact sales fall into two categories: Those that will have subsidized housing in 
their micro-neighborhood in the future (pre-impact sales, e.g., 1987-1995) and those that 
already have such housing in their micro-neighborhood (post-impact sales, e.g., 1989-1997).  
Each impact sale property has its own micro-neighborhood that includes other properties sold 
within the study period.  The micro-neighborhood is defined as the radius (at a specific 
Euclidian distance) from the property, in this case 0-500 feet, 501-1000 feet, 1001-2000 feet 
and 0-1000 feet (a circle of a one thousand feet radius includes about 14 blocks in Seattle).  
These distances were chosen to make results comparable with the existing literature.  Hence, 
the micro-neighborhood is essentially a distance band that moves with each sale. 
An indicator variable for the pre-impact sales (Pre-Dev Price Level) measures the 
average price level in a micro-neighborhood before one or more (un)subsidized housing sites 
or tenants were located there.  The post indicator (Post-Dev Price Level) does the same thing 
afterwards.  To add price trends in the micro-neighborhoods for the pre- and post-impact 
sales, two variables are added that measure the distance in years between the sale year and 
the beginning of the study period (Pre-Dev Price Trend) and that between the sale year and 
the (un)subsidized housing completion date (Post-Dev Price Trend).  In summary, the 
columns in the X matrix are defined as: 
 
           X = Pre-Dev Price Level (indicator)      
        Post-Dev Price Level (indicator) 
        Pre-Dev Price Trend (1, 2, 3 … from 1st sale year) 
        Post-Dev Price Trend (1, 2, 3 … from subsidized year) 
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Hence, the “intervention,” i.e. the new (un)subsidized rental housing, only enters the 
model indirectly through a test of mean price differences for properties inside and outside 
micro-neighborhoods.  The statistical difference between the pre- and post-impact indicators 
is assessed through an F-test. To help interpret the coefficients of the impact variables, they 
are transformed using the standard formula 100(e
b-1) where b is the coefficient estimate to 
account for the log transformation of the dependent variable (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980; 
Galster et al. 2006; Ellen and Voicu 2006).  For instance, a transformed estimate for impact 
price levels of -0.01 means that sales in the impact area are 1% lower than those in the 
control area, i.e. outside the impact area but in the same census tract. 
To determine if impacts vary within the city or for different sub-populations, the base 
model is estimated for three spatial subsets of the data: Single- and multi-family zones 
(Figure 1), six contiguous residential areas based on a combination of pre-existing 
neighborhood boundaries with different proportions of income and race (Figure 3),
4 and three 
income groups defined by 1990 block group data.
5  Single-family zones contain detached 
single-family homes, duplexes and triplex homes.  To have a sufficient number of sales in 
multi-family zoning areas, this area also includes sales in neighborhood commercial and 
residential commercial zones as well as sales within a 300 feet buffer around these three 
zones (also to account for zoning changes in multi-family areas within the 10-year period).   
As common in the literature, the baseline model is estimated separately for all of 
these sub-areas except for the six residential sub-regions for which estimates are obtained 
jointly through the use of spatial regimes (Anselin 1988).  The main difference with spatial 
regimes is that the standard errors of this model are estimated using the entire dataset (rather 
than separate spatial subsets), which leads to more precise estimates.  This model is estimated 
without census tracts and geographic coordinates, which means that control sales are all sales 




This study is based on a comprehensive set of data sources for the period of 1987-
1997.  Data were purchased or obtained for free from the King County Department of 
Assessments (sales, property characteristics, parcel, and unsubsidized apartment data), 
Seattle Public Utilities (aerial images, parcel boundaries and parks, water, zoning and 
elevation data), the Seattle Office of Housing (project-based subsidized housing data), the 
Seattle Housing Authority (project- and tenant-based subsidized housing data) and the 
Census Bureau (1990 and 2000 block group data).     12
The study period of 1987-97 was chosen for several reasons, including relatively 
stable inflation-adjusted median sales prices during this period, with strong increases after 
1997.  Further, the HOPE VI redevelopment of Seattle’s large-scale public housing “garden 
communities” started around 1999. As did light rail construction in the early 2000s, which 
has been associated with increased housing and other development near transit stations.  




The main decisions in cleaning the sales data involved excluding all repeat sales and 
sales with warnings,
6 and truncating prices.  Repeat sales were excluded because structural 
characteristics data were only available for one year, resulting in less precise predictions than 
for non-repeat sales.  Following a practice in related research (Galster et al. 2004a) sales 
prices were truncated to remove low and high outliers.
7  This resulted in a price distribution 
from $40,000 to $460,000.  After cleaning the data, 52,142 sales between 1987 and 1997 
contained all required structural and parcel characteristics.  This is about 20% of the total 
number of housing units enumerated by the 1990 Census (the annual average of about 5,000 
sales per year represents about 2% of all 1989 units).   
Of the 52,142 sales, 29% (15,178 sales) are within 1,000 feet of the 302 project-based 
subsidized sites completed between 1989 and 1997, 26% (13,325 sales) are near the 369 
unsubsidized apartment buildings of that time, and 45% (23,505 sales) near the 1,156 tenants 
who paid for their apartments with vouchers during that time. When modeled separately, 
structural characteristics explain about 50% of house prices in Seattle.  Locational and 
neighborhood characteristics explain the remaining quarter of variation in prices (the R
2 for 
the typical model in this study was 79%).  The average property sold for $157,601 at a square 
footage of 1,531 square feet on a lot of 5,832 square feet.   
 
Project- and Tenant-Based Subsidies 
 
Data on project- and tenant-based rental subsidies were obtained from Seattle’s 
Office of Housing and the Seattle Housing Authority.   The former keeps a full record of 
project-based rental housing subsidized by local, state, and federal sources.  Thus the unusual 
opportunity exists to incorporate all existing project-based subsidized sites from 1940-1996 
in the analysis (2,855 projects), with a primary focus on the 302 projects completed between 
1989 and 1997.
8  In addition, 1,156 records for tenant-assisted units from 1989 to 1997 are   13
 
Figure 1  
included in the analysis (full records 
start in 1993).  Since the number of 
voucher and certificate holders is about 
equal the two categories are pooled in 
this analysis. 
The rental interventions are not 
only unevenly distributed across the 
time period from 1987-1997; they are 
also clustered in space.  Figure 1 shows 
the location of statistically significant 
clusters of project- and tenant-based 
subsidized rentals.  These cluster 
locations reflect the fact that the 
majority of all rental interventions are 
located in multi-family zones (blue 
areas).  The project- and tenant-based 
clusters largely overlap, which means 
that both types of rental interventions 




The analysis of unsubsidized 
rental units is restricted to the new 
construction of apartment buildings with four units or more, and to commercial apartment 
buildings, which include rental units in mixed-use buildings (e.g. storefronts on street level 
and apartment above).  These two groups are pooled for 1989-97 for a total of 369 records.
9   
There are two limitations to using these data.  First, they only include multi-family 
apartments.  Unfortunately, no annual historic data are readily available for single-family 
homes that are renter-occupied.  Second, this study includes all unsubsidized apartments, 
including buildings with tenants who do not have low incomes.  As the results section will 
show this turns out not to be a problem in multi-family zones where neither subsidized nor 
unsubsidized apartments have any impact on nearby property values.  However, it does likely 
bias results upwards in single-family zones where sales prices near unsubsidized apartments 
are more likely to be comparable with control sales after an apartment’s construction.   
   14
RESULTS 
Citywide Baseline Results 
 
The main substantive result generated with the AITS-DID base models for Seattle is 
that negative price gaps between impact and control areas that exist before the completion of 
subsidized housing are reduced afterwards, e.g., from about -8% to -3% for all subsidized 
sites, which represents an almost $8,000 difference for the average property.
10  This finding 
is consistent with other findings in the literature, particularly with findings for New York 
City (e.g., Schwartz et al. 2006; Ellen and Voice 2006), also a strong real estate market.  
Price trend changes are far less substantial, averaging about 1% inclines before completion 
and 1% declines afterwards.  Unsubsidized apartments follow similar trends to subsidized 
ones, suggesting that spillover effects at least partially occur irrespective of subsidy status.   
Sales price differences between impact and control areas before the siting of a new unit often 
disappear after the construction of new unsubsidized apartments.  The larger post-gap closure 
rates for unsubsidized than subsidized units could reflect the fact that the former also include 
units for higher-income tenants.  Since vouchers start off with the comparatively lowest pre-
completion price levels, they are associated with the largest reduction in percentage points 
post-completion.   
These citywide findings mask extreme heterogeneity among subsets of the data 
(Figure 4.1-4.3):  They hold for sales near scattered-site public housing and apartments 
targeting tenants with very-low and low incomes without services but not for sales near 
senior/disabled or supportive housing (which have no significant effect).  Spillover effects 
also vary by distance-related thresholds: Sales near subsidized and unsubsidized apartments 
are most similar to control sales at closer distances (possibly reflecting a multi-family zone 
effect), with greater price differentials (upgrading effects) at larger distances from the 
apartments.  In contrast, sales closest to vouchers have the lowest pre-prices (but the 3% 
upgrading effect remains constant across distances).  Further threshold effects exist for rental 
project sizes and program types: The benefit of a price gap reduction disappears with more 
than three subsidized projects and more than one voucher.  The next section details another 
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Spatially Heterogeneous Results 
 




Almost all 1987-1997 home sales are located in single-family zoning areas (91%; 
light yellow areas in Figure 1).  In contrast, the majority of all subsidized housing (1940-
1997) (and all unsubsidized apartment complexes in this study) is located in multi-family 
(49%), neighborhood/ commercial (9%) or downtown zoning areas. The remaining 36% of 
all subsidized sites are located in single-family zones.  While project-based sites are split 
about equally between single-family (48%) and multi-family (52%) zones in Seattle, the 
majority of tenants with vouchers (60%) live in multi-family zones during the study period. 
Home values are highest at an average of $159,027 in single-family zoning areas 
where single-family homes are surrounded by other single-family homes.  They continue to 
decrease from multi-family ($146,647) to neighborhood commercial ($121,786) to 
manufacturing/industrial ($89,670) zoning areas, reflecting the increased likelihood that 
single-family homes are near multi-family rental apartments or commercial buildings.   
When the 300 foot buffer is applied to multi-family zones, the average price 
difference increases further between homes in single-family zones ($164,009) and those in 
multi-family zones ($145,631).  Compared to homes in single-family zones, homes in multi-
family zones (with buffer) include more duplex and triplex homes, are of lower construction 
quality, have smaller house and lot sizes, are less likely to have scenic views and Gold Coast 
access and are at lower elevations.  Further, 2000 Census data show that multi-family zones 
are home to a larger proportion of residents who are minority (30% vs. 23%), poor (18% vs. 
8%), and renters (74% vs. 35%).  These areas also have lower median gross rents ($441 vs. 




If the Seattle results are generalizable in regards to zoning, then the omission of 
differential impacts by zoning area in most of the current literature is an important one:  
There are no significant impacts of any rental type  (unsubsidized apartments, subsidized 
projects or vouchers located in either single-family or multi-family zones) on sales located in 
Seattle’s multi-family zones (Table 1 with unadjusted betas and Figure 4.2 with adjusted 
betas).  Pre- and post-price levels and trends in multi-family impact areas are 
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Figure 2. Pre-Post Sales Price Levels & Trends (Adj. Betas): Homes in 


























*SF/MF = single- or multi-family zoning; Apt = unsubs; PB = subs project; S8 = voucher
impacts only occur when differences between the intervention and the host neighborhood are 
noticeable, which is less likely in multi-family zones.   
Significant price gap reductions only occur in single-family zoning areas (Figure 2).  
Being located in a single-family zone near a new private or subsidized apartment that is 
located in a multi-family zone is associated with the elimination of a pre-construction 
negative price gap (by about five percentage points for private apartments and four for 
subsidized ones).  Sales in single-family zones near new subsidized apartments or vouchers 
that are also located in single-family zones have comparatively lower pre-price levels (-
5.50% and -7.89%), i.e. pre-sales prices near multi-family subsidized housing are more 
comparable with nearby control prices than sales prices near single-family subsidized rentals.  
Note that this does not necessarily mean that the sales prices of homes near single-family 
subsidies are lower than those near multi-family subsidies. Rather, it means that the contrast 
between sales prices near new rentals and surrounding sales prices is greater in single family 
zones because overall prices are higher in these zones.   
Post-completion gaps for sales near single-family subsidies are reduced by about 
three percentage points for projects (from -4.86% to -2.39%) and by four points for vouchers 
(-7.32% to -3.27%).  However, slightly positive pre-price trends contrast with declining post-
price trends by more than one percentage point for vouchers.  Although the upgrading impact 
of single-family 
vouchers is the largest of 
the three interventions, 
there is no significant 
gap reduction for multi-
family vouchers.  Hence, 
these findings suggest 
that smaller pre-existing 
price differences are 
completely closed in 
impact areas with private 
or subsidized multi-
family apartments. 
Larger pre-gaps are 
partially closed in areas 
with subsidized single-  17
 Figure 3 
family apartments or vouchers – these sales are less likely to have had any exposure to 
subsidized rentals built before 1988.
11   
Gaps are generally larger and reduced more at closer proximities to single-family 
vouchers (from -7% to -3% within 500ft, -5% to 0% for 500-1kft, and -3% to -% for 1k-2kft). 
However, sales near multi-family vouchers experience the same upgrading effects in the two 
distance bands within 1,000ft (from -4% to -2%), with a slight increase (from -5% to -1%) at 







Within each of the six sub-regions (Figure 
3), the largest percentage of sales is in areas that are 
single-family zones, predominantly middle-income, 
white and not near any subsidized housing built 
before 1989 (occupied before 1993 for vouchers), 
and are located in the Gold Coast and Ballard-
Greenlake-University areas.  Higher incomes are 
concentrated along the Gold Coast and in areas 
north of downtown (with the exception of Northgate 
and Lake City in Area 1).  Larger percentages of 
minority residents are generally inversely related to 
higher incomes.   
Area 1 is in the far North of Seattle and 
contains larger clusters of subsidized housing in 
Northgate and Lake City (Figures 1 and 3).  It is 
more diverse in terms of income and race than the 
city as a whole.  Area 2 (Magnolia-Queen Anne-
Capitol Hill) and 5 (Gold Coast) contain some of the richest and whitest areas (even more so 
for the Gold Coast).  In contrast, the Southeast-Central and Delridge areas are among the 
poorest with highest proportions of African-American and Asian residents (Area 3) and 
Hispanic residents (Area 4).  Area 6 is also more mixed but less racially diverse and 
wealthier than the North.  Figure 3 also highlights the distribution of project-based subsidized 
sites built before 1989 and voucher holders who moved into their apartments in 1993.
12     18
Model Results 
 
The expectation outlined in the conceptual framework section was that spillover 
effects are most probable in areas where the new rental unit is less likely to be a close 
substitute of the neighboring properties.  The evidence by zoning area supports this 
expectation.  Results were also generated for sub-areas of the city that fall into different 
income and racial groups (based on both census block group data and residential boundaries; 
Tabe 2 and 3).   
Consistent with expectations, there are no or only small effects in areas with larger 
shares of low and medium income groups.  Also consistent is that the only net negative 
spillover effects found in this study were associated with sales near vouchers in multi-family 
zones in an affluent area (2).  However, the predominant spillover effect is not negative but 
net positive when the lower pre-housing price levels near new rental units are taken into 
account:  The citywide findings of upgrading effects for subsidized projects are driven by 
sales in poor lower-housing-value pockets of the most affluent areas in the city: The Gold 
Coast (waterfront) and the Magnolia-Queen Anne-Lake Union-Capitol Hill corridor.   
Unsubsidized apartments were not associated with any spillover effects when the 
results are broken out by sub-area.  The lack of findings in lower and middle-income areas 




In higher income areas, being near a new subsidized apartment is associated with 
partially closing pre-existing price gaps, from -10% to -3%. This is only true for one of the 
two affluent sub-areas: Sales in the Gold Coast area (5) registered significant upgrading 
effects from -19% to -11% for sales near subsidized projects in single-family zones and from 
-13% to 0% for those in multi-family zones. However, area 2 (Lake Union corridor) was not 
associated with any significant effect at the 0.01 level (Table 2 and 3). 
Similarly, for sales in high-income block groups, the proximity to vouchers was also 
associated with large upgrading effects, from -13% to -4%, with slightly positive pre-trends 
(0.8%) and small negative post-trends (-2%). However, this finding appears to be driven by 
data subsets and does not hold for all high-income areas when sub-areas are analyzed: In the 
Gold Coast area (5), an upgrading effect was associated with proximity to vouchers in single-
family zones (from -16% to -7%) – there were no spillover effects at the 0.05 level for the 
multi-family case.  In contrast, sales that experienced a significant net negative post-impact 
were those near vouchers in multi-family zones in the Lake Union corridor area (2), with no   19
difference prior to move-in and a 6% negative differential afterwards (about $9,500 for the 
average sale). In both areas, the proximity to vouchers results in 1-2% price declines over 
time compared to control sales.   
In high-income areas and area 2, there is no significant difference (at a 0.05 level) 
between sales near unsubsidized apartments before or after the apartment was built.  This 
probably reflects the fact that unsubsidized multi-family apartments in higher-income areas 
are more likely upscale than low-income rentals; a fact that biases study results upwards.  
However, a large upgrading effect is associated with proximity to unsubsidized apartments in 
the Gold Coast area (5).   
 
Diverse Areas   
 
There are no significant pre- or post price differences for sales near subsidized 
projects or unsubsidized apartments in the medium income block groups and in the two areas 
north of the ship canal (1 and 6) that are more diverse in terms of race and income (Table 2 
and 3). This is also true for vouchers in areas 1 and 6. However, small voucher upgrading 




The same pattern holds for lower-income areas: In low-income block groups and the 
more Hispanic area 4 (Delridge), no spillover effects were associated with subsidized 
projects (Table 2 and 3).  In the more African-American Southeast (Area 3), the same was 
true for subsidized projects in multi-family zones but sales near projects in single-family 
zones did benefit from upgrading effects from -5% to 0% – the only impact in this area. In 
lower-income areas and sub-areas 3 and 4, which are less affluent and more diverse, neither 
vouchers nor unsubsidized apartments were associated with spillover effects at a 0.01 level. 
 
INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS  
 
For the most part, the dominant finding of upgrading effects associated with the 
proximity to new unsubsidized and subsidized apartments as well as vouchers in Seattle 
supports “Why not in My Backyard” research results.  The comparison with unsubsidized 
apartments demonstrated that upgrading effects occur irregardless of subsidy status, possibly 
as a new construction effect.  It is important to highlight the importance of taking into 
account the lower pre-development prices – in models that only contain post-indicators for   20
proximity to rental housing (e.g., Lee et al., 1999), an upgrading effect would be 
misinterpreted as a negative effect when post-price levels are still lower than control prices.  
Housing vouchers, especially larger concentrations (as in multi-family vouchers), are the 
only program that registered negative spillover effects – in this case in affluent 
neighborhoods.  These findings are generally consistent with other research although other 
research found negative voucher effects for low-income rather than high-income areas 
(Galster et al., 1999).  Similar upgrading effects have been found for cities with active 
subsidized housing programs and strong real estate markets, such as New York (e.g. Ellen 
and Voicu 2006).   
The fact that significant spatial variation in spillover effects was found warrants 
caution when results are reported at aggregate levels, such as the city or national level. In 
Seattle’s case, the citywide result of upgrading effects turns out to be driven by price 
increases of properties in low-value pockets of single-family areas in affluent, less diverse 
neighborhoods.  Lower- and middle-income areas with greater racial diversity generally 
experienced no or very small spillover (upgrading) effects, which is consistent with the 
expectation that new rental developments are more likely to constitute close substitutes of 
nearby properties. The conceptual framework did predict more negative spillovers in higher-
income areas (rather than upgrading effects) – however, as outlined below, Seattle’s housing 
policies and possibly growth pressures might explain the more dominant upgrading effects. 
Plausible explanations for the predominant price gap reduction finding in Seattle 
could be related to Seattle’s dispersion and neighborhood relations guidelines, which seek to 
mitigate negative impacts, the sound management of the city’s subsidized housing programs 
(including a cadre of exceptional nonprofit affordable rental and owner housing developers), 
and an overall emphasis on strategic planning that, e.g., is reflected in the city’s housing 
investment areas and other community revitalization efforts.  Given this context, positive 
impacts from new construction/rehabilitation and the removal of disamenities are made 
possible. 
This explanation is related to the design and implementation of the city’s 
longstanding dispersion policies.  The policies mitigate negative impacts in single-family 
zoning areas by reducing concentration levels (e.g., by limiting subsidized housing units to 
initially 40% and currently 20% of all units in a block group).  In addition, the city asks 
subsidized housing developers to address any potential concerns from neighbors before and 
after the completion of a project.  Specifically, the city’s neighborhood notification and 
community relations guidelines (specified in the city’s Consolidated Plan; City of Seattle 
2004) request that developers notify all neighbors within 500 feet (initially 300 feet).    21
Further, they are to contact neighborhood organizations, invite residents to open houses, and 
keep open communication.  The guidelines are formalized as a good neighbor policy in case 
of any problems. 
Another explanation is that the city’s and state’s emphasis on subsidized housing 
dispersion and integration has resulted in an improvement of the design of subsidized 
housing, which makes it more compatible.  Whether intended or unintended, a side effect of 
the dispersion policies seems to have been a closing of the quality differential between 
subsidized and market-rate units in areas with higher home values.  On a side note, Seattle 
significantly advanced the trend toward mixed incomes and mixed uses since the end of the 
study period, e.g., in its HOPE VI redevelopments and through its urban village overlays.  
To address this question of compatibility, site visits were conducted in five Seattle 
neighborhoods on April 25-28, 2007.  They were located throughout the city in single- and 
multi-family zoning areas and represented all major types of subsidized housing built during 
different years and eras (vouchers, supportive and senior buildings, scattered sites, subsidized 
homeownership, mixed-use tax credit apartments, and traditional public housing).  An expert 
in affordable housing and spillover modeling was asked to identify which of the one or more 
units on a face block were subsidized without knowing the answer in advance.  The results 
were rather consistent: Traditional scattered-site housing was relatively easy to identify due 
to more standardized designs, replication of design for neighboring properties, less 
landscaping, and the occasional shopping cart in the front yard.  The tax credit-financed 
mixed-use development in a multi-family area (integrated with a shopping mall and including 
high-end apartments with elaborate landscaping) was indistinguishable.  When voucher 
holders in single-family areas were correctly identified, race was the identifying factor 
(African-American tenants in predominantly white neighborhoods). Vouchers in multi-family 
apartments were much more difficult to detect.  Supportive housing was hard to miss, often 
because of signs identifying the foster home or mental health agency.  Finally, large 
complexes (often senior housing) built, for instance, with HUD’s Section 8 project funding, 
could be identified by a more institutional look. 
The heterogeneity of these impressions mirrors that of the AITS-DID findings.  The 
site visits also confirmed the result that subsidized sites tend to be located in pockets with 
lower housing values.  For instance, the three sites in West and Southeast Seattle were within 
minutes of driving distance of expensive Gold Coast properties.  However, the properties 
themselves were in the lower-value valley areas that lacked the spectacular views of 
neighboring areas and were closer to highways or traffic noise.  The sites in the North of 
Seattle were an example of locating subsidized sites in so-called buffer areas bordering multi-  22
family and single-family zones.  They were closer to major roads, commercial and other 
mixed-use activity, including privately operated motels that serve as transitional housing or 
other cheap multi-family apartments. 
As far as the impact results are concerned, one of the main results of the site visits 
was that –without exception—the unsubsidized private apartments next door to and in the 
near vicinity of the subsidized ones were of worse quality.  For instance, while the 
unsubsidized neighboring homes had roofs in need of repair, chipped paint, broken fences, 
trash or junk in the yard, or other signs of deteriorating maintenance, these signs were absent 
from the subsidized units.  In other words, the subsidized apartments were unanimously of 
better exterior quality than their immediate neighbors even if they were of lower quality 




What might be a plausible threat to the conclusion validity of these explanations?  An 
alternative explanation on a macro-scale related to gentrification received some attention in 
the literature on New York City spillover effects (e.g., Schwartz et al. 2006) but was not seen 
as primary in that context.  In contrast, it is possible that, in the Seattle context, the 
displacement and supplement of lower-income residents by those with higher incomes might 
at least partially explain the reduced price gap finding.   
There is clear evidence of population and income growth in Seattle during the 1990s, 
fueled by the high tech boom in Seattle and East King County.
13  Also during this time, the 
majority of the city’s population growth (60%) occurred in the two highest income quartiles.  
Concurrently, six of the seven places that experienced reductions in median income were in 
South King County (City of Seattle Finance Department 2003), reflecting an outmigration of 
low-income residents who could no longer afford city rents. 
One of the questions in this context is if there was a loss of affordable low-income 
rentals and a gain in higher-income new construction units to reflect the population changes 
of this time.  Advocacy organizations claim that Seattle also experienced a net loss of rental 
units affordable to tenants with low incomes.
14  It is possible that subsidized housing is sited 
in areas that experience a loss of affordable private units.  Further, a national study found that 
rental housing developers are pre-selecting areas that are about to gentrify (Baum-Snow 
2006).To answer this question within an AITS framework, annual address-level data is 
needed on new construction and demolition permits and condo conversions.  This question is 
currently analyzed in a separate research project by the author.      23
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
 
This study has several methodological limitations that should be considered in the 
interpretation of results: A spatial mismatch between impact and control areas, spatially 
overlapping interventions, a lack of density of sales, and spatial and serial autocorrelation.  
For instance, in regards to the first three limitations it is possible that the lack of impacts in 
lower-income areas is a methodological artifact:  One of the problems in the lower-income 
group is that there are not enough control sales since most sales are near subsidized sites.  In 
addition, many sales are near more than one subsidized site of different years, which results 
in higher collinearity between the pre- and post variables in the lower-income subset, which 
in turn could be related to non-significant impacts.  Further, the upward bias associated with 
the inclusion of high-income apartments in the unsubsidized housing data was already 
mentioned throughout the study. 
Although 52,142 is a sizable sample number, there is still a scarcity of sales in the 
immediate vicinity of new rental developments.  The under-representation of abutting sales is 
a principal problem in many analyses and extends to repeat-sales designs.  It is related to an 
uneven spatial distribution of sales, with higher concentrations in single-family zoning areas 
and amenity-rich neighborhoods and lower concentrations in lower-income neighborhoods.  
It is possible that potential negative impacts are missed as a result of a lack of abutting sales 
in the sample. 
The AITS-DID model with spatial fixed effects is estimated with OLS (with robust 
standard errors) for imbalanced panel data.  Recent econometric research on difference-in-
difference models estimated with OLS found serious biases in standard errors due to a failure 
to control for serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004). Similarly, a diagnostic test of spatial 
autocorrelation of the OLS residuals of the Seattle models found that the spatial fixed effects 
and geographic coordinates only partially controlled for the problem, in which case the 
impact coefficients are biased and/or inefficient (Anselin 1988). Impact results from spatial 
regression models that were estimated at an annual level,
15 tended to differ from the OLS 
ones primarily in cases that were significant at the 0.05 level, although there are exceptions to 
this rule of thumb.  A more systematic analysis of these autocorrelation problems in the 
context of rental spillover modeling is the subject of concurrent research by the author and 
colleagues. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
  The focus on spatial heterogeneity, zoning area, and unsubsidized rentals in spillover 
modeling that characterizes the contribution of this article has several methodological and 
policy-relevant implications.  The main methodological conclusion of this study is that the 
relationship between pre- and post-prices is very sensitive to how the data are pooled across 
space.  In cases where pre-price levels differ between impact and control areas, pre-prices in 
impact areas are consistently lower compared to control areas.  However, based on how the 
data are pooled across space (e.g. by zoning area or sub-areas), the pre-post relationship 
changes from non-significant to different versions of significant post-price gap reductions, 
and in some cases significant net negative post effects. The concern here is that every 
additional spatial subset potentially generates a new spillover result, ranging from neutral to 
upgrade to net negative (whereby the first two effects were most dominant in this study).  
There is a point where the continuous spatial sub-setting starts to resemble the original 
control area design with one pre-post, impact-control test for each small group of subsidized 
sites.  
In this context, the tempting conclusion in spillover effects research that the findings 
are robust to alternative specifications should be regarded with caution if spatial variability in 
house prices, neighborhood characteristics, and rental developments exist as in the Seattle 
case.  Another important conclusion of this study’s findings is that the lack of spatial 
stationarity for both sales and rental data is problematic at an aggregate level since these 
results end up being driven by particular sub-areas that are not representative of other sub-
areas. Hence, similar caution is warranted when only aggregate (e.g. citywide) results are 
reported. 
The development of new rental projects ended up upgrading micro-areas with below 
average pre-existing housing values, particularly near affluent areas.  From a planning 
perspective, areas where rental developments constitute close substitutes of surrounding 
properties (such as in multi-family zones) are least likely to have any significant spillover 
effects. The findings of similar spillover effects for unsubsidized apartments suggest a need 
for further research on this topic with improved data, e.g., low-income apartments or renter-
occupied single-family homes.  An implication for policy and planning debates is that the 
focus on the subsidy status of rental developments (with the assumption that all subsidized 
rentals are problematic) is often misguided. One of the methodological implications of 
excluding unsubsidized rentals from typical spillover studies (e.g., where only a single 
program is analyzed) is that impacts might be spuriously attributed to the subsidized site   25
rather than the unsubsidized one when both are completed at the same time and place (e.g., 
for Seattle up to 20% of all sales were in this category). 
Seattle fits the best practice case better than the representative case when it comes to 
subsidized housing dispersion policies and property impact mitigation practices.  The 
findings could guide other cities in how to successfully mitigate potential negative property 
value impacts, albeit under conditions of economic growth and more widespread support for 
integrated housing. The lesson here is that property value impacts from subsidized housing 
are extremely context-sensitive, which makes them difficult to measure in the aggregate but 
the relevant factors of this context (e.g., siting location, distance to other properties, size, 
project concentration, program type) can be influenced by planning decisions.  This study’s 
findings illustrate a case where it has been possible to mitigate potential negative subsidized 
rental impacts through pro-active policies such as dispersion, good neighbor guidelines, and 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 For instance, Straszheim (1974) originally argued for submarkets in different geographic areas of San 
Francisco under two strict conditions:  One, that there is no significant cross-over of purchasers between 
submarkets, and, two, that the structure of demand, supply or both must differ between submarkets.   
2 The standard AITS specification includes a full trend surface, i.e., polynomial transformations of these 
coordinates. Since these transformed variables are highly collinear with the untransformed coordinates, 
only the latter are included in this specification.     29
                                                                                                                                                 
3 It turns out that the choice of spatial fixed effects (e.g., tracts or larger neighborhood boundaries) changes 
impact results only marginally. The same is true for the inclusion of geographic coordinates (in both cases, 
the explained variance is 78-79%). However, when spatial fixed effects are excluded, impacted sales prices 
are compared with citywide averages, which dramatically increases the price differentials. 
4 The residential area boundaries were obtained from the King County Department of Assessment. 
5 The three income groups are defined based on median household incomes in block groups (1990 Census 
data).  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 1990 median family income for four 
persons in the Seattle metropolitan statistical area was $41,500.  The three groups are defined as below 
median income (< $41,500), median to 140% of median ($41,500-$58,100) and above 140% of median 
income (> $58,100).  Although a more typical specification of below 80% of median, 80-120% and above 
120% would have been preferred, the sample sizes within these categories were too imbalanced.   
6 Sales warnings included, for instance, non-arms length transactions between family members, sales to 
nonprofits, air rights only, foreclosures and settlements.   
7 The bottom 1% of sales was excluded to remove unrealistically low prices (e.g., $100); the top 2% was 
removed to exclude properties from Seattle’s luxury housing segment.   
8 Since many projects contain multiple funding sources and a preliminary analysis found differential effects 
within the same funding source (e.g., tax-credit funded homeless shelters versus senior housing), the 
projects are grouped in four categories:  1) Housing for seniors or residents who are physically disabled, 2) 
housing with supportive services (e.g., psychiatric services, homeless shelters, AIDS/HIV or foster homes) 
, 3) the Seattle Housing Authority’s scattered-site program, and 4) apartments without services for tenants 
with very low and low incomes, including transitional/permanent housing for formerly homeless residents 
(e.g., many of these apartments target tenants with incomes below 40 to 50% of median, i.e. below 
$16,600-$20,750, according to HUD’s 1990 area median family income definition of $41,500 for a 4-
person household in Seattle).   
9 The apartment buildings that overlap with project-based subsidized buildings are excluded from the 
analysis.  However, the ones that contain vouchers are included to avoid removing large numbers of low-
income apartments (and the intervention differs for year built vs move-in date).  
10 The full set of statistical tables for the impact results in this results section is available from the author 
upon request. 
11 Separate impact results are obtained for sales not near any project-based subsidized housing before 1989, 
near 1-3 sites, and near more than three sites before 1989.   
12 These sites were used to define the baseline categories for whether or not a sale was near one or more 
subsidized sites before the study period. 
13 Between the 1990 and 2000 Census surveys, Seattle’s population grew by about 47,000 residents and 
about 21,500 new units were added to the housing stock.  The city’s inflation-adjusted median household 
income increased by three percent from $41,696 to $45,736 during this time (U.S. Census Bureau).   
14 For instance, based on an analysis of downtown housing and condo data, John Fox from Seattle’s 
Displacement Coalition claims: “For every unit of subsidized housing we provide, our city is losing 3 to 4 
times that amount of low cost units to the forces of demolition, condominium conversions, speculative sale, 
and increased rents” (Power and Williams 2007: 181). 
15 The AITS-DID models pool ten or more years of sales data. It would be inappropriate to add one spatial 
lag for this time period since it unrealistic to assume that the spatial autoregressive coefficient remains 
constant across this period.   Table 1.  Impact Results, by Zoning Area
1.1 Sales in Single-Family Zones 1.2 Sales in Multi-Family Zones
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
PreLevApt1k -0.047 0.011 -4.36 0.000 *** 0.017 0.010 1.61 0.107
PreTRApt1k 0.008 0.002 3.09 0.002 *** -0.005 0.002 -2.41 0.016
PostLevApt1k 0.002 0.007 0.27 0.785 *** 0.013 0.007 1.92 0.054
PostTRApt1k 0.002 0.002 1.08 0.281 *** -0.004 0.001 -2.80 0.005
PreLevProjSF1k -0.057 0.008 -6.94 0.000 *** -0.007 0.013 -0.58 0.559
PreTRProjSF1k 0.006 0.002 3.46 0.001 *** -0.002 0.003 -0.62 0.535
PostLevProjSF1k -0.024 0.005 -4.43 0.000 *** -0.008 0.009 -0.91 0.363
PostTRProjSF1k -0.001 0.001 -1.24 0.216 *** -0.001 0.002 -0.61 0.543
PreLevProjMF1k -0.035 0.017 -2.05 0.041 ** 0.000 0.013 0.01 0.992
PreTRProjMF1k 0.004 0.004 0.97 0.334 ** -0.006 0.003 -2.25 0.024
PostLevProjMF1k 0.010 0.013 0.83 0.408 ** -0.008 0.008 -0.94 0.348
PostTRProjMF1k -0.008 0.004 -2.12 0.034 ** -0.001 0.002 -0.55 0.584
PreLevS8SF1k -0.082 0.008 -10.01 0.000 *** -0.019 0.012 -1.69 0.091
PreTRS8SF1k 0.006 0.001 4.42 0.000 *** 0.000 0.002 0.11 0.911
PostLevS8SF1k -0.021 0.007 -3.04 0.002 *** 0.001 0.010 0.09 0.931
PostTRS8SF1k -0.012 0.003 -3.87 0.000 *** -0.003 0.004 -0.76 0.449
PreLevS8MF1k -0.034 0.009 -3.84 0.000 -0.011 0.010 -1.15 0.252
PreTRS8MF1k 0.001 0.002 0.38 0.704 0.000 0.002 -0.23 0.821
PostLevS8MF1k -0.027 0.008 -3.18 0.001 -0.010 0.008 -1.31 0.191
PostTRS8MF1k 0.006 0.004 1.65 0.099 -0.003 0.003 -0.86 0.390
***0.001 **0.05 *0.1 blank: not significant
1F-Test Sign. post-variable = post vs. pre sig. 
 All variables sig.= (pre-level+trend)-(post-level+trend) sig.2.1  Income Base Model 2.4  Income Group 3 (Higher)
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
PreLevApt1k -0.027 0.007 -3.90 0.000 *** -0.053 0.022 -2.45 0.014 *
PreTRApt1k 0.002 0.001 1.32 0.185 *** 0.003 0.005 0.58 0.564 *
PostLevApt1k 0.001 0.005 0.29 0.773 *** -0.009 0.014 -0.640 0.524 *
PostTRApt1k -0.002 0.001 -2.18 0.029 *** -0.002 0.003 -0.530 0.595 *
PreLevProj1k -0.046 0.006 -7.17 0.000 *** -0.105 0.020 -5.24 0.000 ***
PreTRProj1k 0.003 0.001 1.95 0.051 *** 0.005 0.006 0.96 0.338 ***
PostLevProj1k -0.019 0.004 -4.44 0.000 *** -0.031 0.013 -2.45 0.014 ***
PostTRProj1k -0.003 0.001 -2.62 0.009 *** 0.000 0.003 0.10 0.924 ***
PreLevS81k -0.060 0.006 -10.54 0.000 *** -0.128 0.016 -8.18 0.000 ***
PreTRS81k 0.004 0.001 3.95 0.000 *** 0.008 0.003 3.29 0.001 ***
PostLevS81k -0.015 0.005 -3.11 0.002 *** -0.041 0.013 -3.22 0.001 ***
PostTRS81k -0.009 0.002 -4.22 0.000 *** -0.015 0.006 -2.52 0.012 ***
N = 13,277 R2 = 76%
2.2  Income Group 1 (Lower)
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
PreLevApt1k -0.020 0.010 -2.02 0.044 ** ***0.001 **0.05 *0.1
PreTRApt1k 0.000 0.002 -0.03 0.974 **
1F-Test: Sign. post-variable = post vs. pre sig. 
PostLevApt1k 0.003 0.007 0.37 0.708 **
PostTRApt1k -0.004 0.002 -2.360 0.018 **
PreLevProj1k -0.008 0.010 -0.830 0.406
PreTRProj1k -0.002 0.002 -1.010 0.312
PostLevProj1k 0.003 0.006 0.470 0.640
PostTRProj1k -0.002 0.001 -1.320 0.186
PreLevS81k -0.008 0.010 -0.830 0.409
PreTRS81k -0.002 0.001 -1.180 0.240
PostLevS81k -0.001 0.007 -0.200 0.841
PostTRS81k -0.002 0.003 -0.770 0.443
N = 17,040 R2 = 76%
2.3  Income Group 2 (Medium)
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
PreLevApt1k -0.007 0.011 -0.65 0.513
PreTRApt1k -0.001 0.002 -0.35 0.729
PostLevApt1k 0.009 0.007 1.34 0.180
PostTRApt1k -0.003 0.002 -1.61 0.107
PreLevProj1k -0.028 0.010 -2.89 0.004
PreTRProj1k -0.001 0.002 -0.380 0.706
PostLevProj1k -0.022 0.006 -3.62 0.000
PostTRProj1k -0.003 0.001 -1.82 0.069
PreLevS81k -0.041 0.008 -5.01 0.000 ***
PreTRS81k 0.002 0.001 1.64 0.102 ***
PostLevS81k -0.015 0.007 -2.15 0.032 ***
PostTRS81k -0.006 0.003 -2.10 0.035 ***
N = 21,825 R2 = 78%
Table 2.  Impact Results, by Income Group
 All variables sig.= (pre-level+trend)-(post-level+trend) 
sig.Table 3.1   Area 1 (North, mixed-inc., more diverse)  Table 3.2   Area 2 (Lake, affluent) Table 3.3   Area 3 (SE, lower-inc)
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
Beta Rob. SE T P F
1
Beta Rob. SE t P F
1
PreLevApt1k -0.018 0.015 -1.19 0.232 -0.054 0.020 -2.70 0.007 * 0.001 0.023 0.06 0.956
PreTRApt1k 0.002 0.003 0.61 0.541 -0.001 0.005 -0.16 0.868 * -0.004 0.005 -0.78 0.433
PostLevApt1k 0.002 0.010 0.23 0.814 -0.015 0.014 -1.08 0.279 * -0.034 0.016 -2.21 0.027
PostTRApt1k -0.002 0.002 -0.98 0.327 -0.009 0.003 -2.88 0.004 * 0.006 0.004 1.52 0.128
PreLevProjSF1k -0.026 0.016 -1.57 0.117 0.004 0.045 0.09 0.937 -0.048 0.017 -2.87 0.004 ***
PreTRProjSF1k 0.002 0.004 0.42 0.672 0.001 0.013 0.10 0.912 0.005 0.004 1.32 0.187 ***
PostLevProjSF1k -0.015 0.009 -1.60 0.110 0.029 0.034 0.84 0.398 -0.004 0.011 -0.40 0.692 ***
PostTRProjSF1k -0.001 0.002 -0.65 0.516 0.013 0.007 1.82 0.069 -0.001 0.003 -0.41 0.683 ***
PreLevProjMF1k -0.043 0.020 -2.12 0.034 -0.074 0.033 -2.24 0.025 -0.042 0.020 -2.12 0.034
PreTRProjMF1k 0.003 0.004 0.76 0.445 -0.005 0.009 -0.58 0.558 0.001 0.004 0.14 0.883
PostLevProjMF1k -0.030 0.015 -2.06 0.039 -0.084 0.026 -3.29 0.001 -0.005 0.012 -0.41 0.683
PostTRProjMF1k 0.002 0.004 0.53 0.596 0.003 0.007 0.41 0.678 -0.005 0.003 -1.64 0.101
PreLevS8SF1k -0.012 0.016 -0.76 0.449 -0.221 0.032 -7.00 0.000 -0.054 0.016 -3.41 0.001 *
PreTRS8SF1k 0.000 0.003 -0.13 0.892 0.025 0.006 3.83 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.99 0.321 *
PostLevS8SF1k -0.013 0.018 -0.72 0.473 -0.072 0.037 -1.93 0.054 ** -0.026 0.012 -2.24 0.025 *
PostTRS8SF1k -0.005 0.008 -0.56 0.579 -0.023 0.019 -1.17 0.242 -0.008 0.004 -1.89 0.059 *
PreLevS8MF1k -0.020 0.015 -1.35 0.177 0.022 0.021 1.05 0.295 *** -0.037 0.015 -2.55 0.011
PreTRS8MF1k 0.001 0.003 0.33 0.739 -0.006 0.004 -1.56 0.118 *** -0.002 0.003 -0.68 0.493
PostLevS8MF1k -0.015 0.015 -1.04 0.299 -0.061 0.023 -2.60 0.009 *** 0.001 0.013 0.09 0.923
PostTRS8MF1k 0.002 0.006 0.38 0.700 0.017 0.011 1.50 0.135 *** -0.008 0.005 -1.64 0.101
R
2=78% N=8,235 N=5,420 N=8,505
1F-Test: Sign. post-variable = post vs. pre sig. 
 All variables sig.= (pre-level+trend)-(post-level+trend) sig.
Table 3. Impact Results, by Sub-AreaTable 3. Impact Results by Area, continued
Table 3.4   Area 4 (Delridge, lower inc.) Table 3.5   Area 5 (Gold Cost, rich) Table 3.6   Area 6 (Greenlake, mixed)
Beta Rob. SE t P F
1
Beta Rob. SE t P F
1
Beta Rob. SE t P F
1
PreLevApt1k 0.012 0.039 0.29 0.769 -0.126 0.017 -7.65 0.000 *** -0.006 0.012 -0.46 0.644
PreTRApt1k -0.003 0.010 -0.28 0.777 0.019 0.003 5.71 0.000 *** 0.000 0.003 0.14 0.883
PostLevApt1k 0.035 0.023 1.50 0.133 -0.018 0.012 -1.48 0.138 *** -0.003 0.008 -0.41 0.680
PostTRApt1k 0.006 0.006 1.10 0.271 -0.005 0.003 -1.83 0.068 *** 0.000 0.002 0.17 0.868
PreLevProjSF1k 0.044 0.028 1.54 0.124 ** -0.191 0.024 -7.90 0.000 *** -0.045 0.014 -3.10 0.002
PreTRProjSF1k -0.009 0.008 -1.17 0.242 ** 0.011 0.006 1.77 0.076 *** 0.003 0.003 1.14 0.255
PostLevProjSF1k -0.012 0.015 -0.80 0.423 ** -0.109 0.016 -6.95 0.000 *** -0.050 0.012 -4.26 0.000
PostTRProjSF1k 0.008 0.003 2.50 0.013 ** 0.007 0.003 2.06 0.039 *** 0.005 0.004 1.55 0.121
PreLevProjMF1k -0.103 0.040 -2.54 0.011 -0.132 0.044 -3.02 0.003 ** 0.016 0.020 0.79 0.427
PreTRProjMF1k 0.013 0.008 1.60 0.111 0.032 0.011 2.92 0.004 ** -0.008 0.005 -1.81 0.071
PostLevProjMF1k -0.091 0.023 -3.88 0.000 -0.003 0.029 -0.10 0.923 ** -0.031 0.016 -2.01 0.045
PostTRProjMF1k 0.002 0.006 0.35 0.722 -0.003 0.006 -0.54 0.590 ** -0.004 0.005 -0.95 0.344
PreLevS8SF1k -0.083 0.019 -4.40 0.000 -0.157 0.019 -8.21 0.000 *** -0.008 0.017 -0.50 0.619
PreTRS8SF1k 0.006 0.003 1.85 0.064 0.005 0.004 1.35 0.176 *** 0.004 0.003 1.28 0.201
PostLevS8SF1k -0.040 0.015 -2.66 0.008 * -0.069 0.021 -3.24 0.001 *** 0.023 0.019 1.18 0.239
PostTRS8SF1k -0.005 0.007 -0.73 0.464 -0.022 0.010 -2.28 0.022 *** 0.007 0.009 0.78 0.436
PreLevS8MF1k 0.028 0.021 1.31 0.189 -0.112 0.016 -7.04 0.000 -0.036 0.012 -3.05 0.002
PreTRS8MF1k -0.013 0.004 -3.46 0.001 0.005 0.003 1.79 0.074 0.002 0.002 1.12 0.261
PostLevS8MF1k -0.026 0.019 -1.35 0.178 ** -0.058 0.016 -3.68 0.000 * -0.019 0.012 -1.64 0.101
PostTRS8MF1k 0.004 0.008 0.56 0.575 ** -0.003 0.007 -0.48 0.633 0.003 0.005 0.69 0.488
R
2=78% N=4,266 N=11,485 N=14,231
1F-Test: Sign. post-variable = post vs. pre sig. 
 All variables sig.= (pre-level+trend)-(post-level+trend) sig.